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ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATION
AND THE FRONTIERS OF
GATEKEEPING
WILLIAM H. SIMON*

Introduction
I spend more than half of my Professional Responsibility (“PR”) survey
course discussing issues distinctive to organizational clients. I do so in part
to take into account the realities of practice. If we can generalize from
John Heinz and Edward Laumann’s Chicago study, about sixty-five percent
of lawyering time is devoted to organizational clients. Yet, the PR issues
involved in representing organizational clients occupy a comparatively
small portion of legal doctrine, casebooks, and scholarship.
Another reason I emphasize organizational clients is that recent
developments in this sphere, especially in securities and tax, have great
general interest.
First, these developments represent fairly strong modifications or
reinterpretations of traditional doctrine on confidentiality and disclosure.
The tax rules, in particular, expand the idea of the lawyer as gatekeeper at
the expense of traditional confidentiality to a more radical extent than
academic critics have ever proposed, or perhaps would have even have
contemplated, prior to their enactment.
Second, the securities and tax initiatives represent radical departures
from the traditional institutional structure of professional regulation
centered on state judiciaries and bar associations. Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereinafter “S-Ox”) represents the first
federal statute in the history of the country to regulate lawyers directly and
broadly. The second came two years later in the form of the tax
enforcement provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
One way to view these developments is as manifestations of the trend
toward fragmentation or contextualization of doctrine identified by David
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Wilkins and John Leubsdorf. But the securities and tax developments have
more general significance as well. The securities norms are simply the
most developed effort to date to take account of a longstanding and oftenignored problem that arises with any organizational client—what does it
mean to be loyal to an entity that consists of multiple constituencies with
potentially conflicting interests?
For their part, the new tax norms are a response to a problem that arises
in many areas of both public and private law—the use of literalistic or
formalistic interpretation to frustrate or evade implicit understanding or
responsibility. Thus, one could see the securities and tax developments as
augurs of a broader change.
At the same time, there is an interesting difference in the security and tax
bar’s response to the gatekeeper idea—or the concept that the lawyer’s role
should involve more public responsibility than it traditionally has. In the
securities realm, practitioners have uniformly resisted the gatekeeper role,
and they have been politically effective—though only partially—in muting
reform. In the tax area, as Tanina Rostain has reported, paractitioners have
been divided, and professional opposition to reform has had much less
effect.
Securities
The core of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an “up-the-ladder” reporting
requirement. In essence, it mandates that lawyers who encounter evidence
that agents of their organizational clients are violating the securities laws or
fiduciary duties report such violations to senior executives. Thereafter, the
reporting lawyers must either (a) ascertain that any problems have been
rectified or (b) make sure the board is aware of the evidence.
In principle, this is not a radical intervention, and its requirements were
arguably implicit in the pre-existing Model Rule (“MR”) 1.13. However,
S-Ox does innovate in important respects. First, the pre-existing 1.13
requirements were highly ambiguous, perhaps deliberately so; S-Ox is
comparatively specific.
Second, S-Ox subverts a strong managerialist inclination that is
powerfully influential in practice and occasionally surfaces in doctrine.
This tendency encourages lawyers to identify the organizational client with
the managers with whom they deal directly and who make the decisions to
retain them. By contrast, S-Ox encourages the lawyer to identify the
corporation with its board, and particularly, the independent directors. This
is a big step in the right direction, and sometimes requires difficult action
on the part of lawyers.
Third, in one aspect, S-Ox departs notably from the
fragmentation/contextualization view. Although S-Ox by its terms applies
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only to public corporations, revisions to MR 1.13 designed to improve
consistency with S-Ox have expanded these guidelines to encompass all
organizational clients.
S-Ox contributes to the gatekeeping trend that has virtually eliminated
the practical significance of confidentiality in the organizational context.
This expansion of the gatekeeper ideal complements other doctrines. These
doctrines include: first, the doctrine of Garner v. Wolfenbarger, 430 F. 2d
1093 (5th Cir. 1970) that allows plaintiffs in shareholder suits who satisfy
certain conditions to discover privileged communications between
managers and the organization’s lawyers; second, the doctrine of CFTC v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985), which holds that when the corporation is
in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee controls the corporate privilege even
with respect to communications before bankruptcy.
The third is the longstanding evidence doctrine, wherein privilege does
not apply to “underlying facts.” This means that a lawyer representing a
corporation in connection with civil discovery or securities compliance
must disclose damaging information even when learned from a confidential
communication.
The cumulative effect of these doctrines is that a lawyer for an
organization is virtually never in a position to honestly and credibly
reassure the organization’s agents that they will not be worse off for having
confided individually damaging information.
Nevertheless, the securities bar continues to resist gatekeeper
responsibilities on the grounds that they compromise confidentiality. We
can see this in two notable campaigns of recent years.
First, the securities bar defeated the SEC’s “noisy withdrawal” proposal
that would have required lawyers withdrawing from representing public
companies to announce that fact in an SEC filing and explain the reasons
for the withdrawal, as auditors have long been required to do.
Second, the bar, in a bizarre alliance with the ACLU and the United
States Chamber of Commerce, forced the DOJ to limit its practice of
requiring corporations, as a condition of deferred prosecution, to waive
attorney-client privilege with respect to internal investigations of
wrongdoing.
In both cases, the securities bar’s arguments rested on claims that
compliance is impeded by gatekeeping responsibilities because such
responsibilities impair managerial trust in lawyers. But the claims about
managerial trust rest on a largely mythical portrayal of the power of
confidentiality in the corporate context.
Tax
The IRS supplements and preempts state PR law in the tax area in
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several ways. First, under regulations known as Circ. 230, the IRS
regulates the support threshold a position must have before the practitioner
can (1) sign a return based on it, or even (2) give written advice with
respect to it. The rules vary by situation, but in all instances the
requirements are higher than those prescribed by the relevant Model Rules,
especially 3.1, which might be read to authorize any non-frivolous position.
Second, a variety of interventions have contributed to the dramatic
curtailment of the more aggressive practices associated with the corporate
tax shelters of the 1990s. They include:
• a set of rules regulating opinions given for the purposes of “penalty
protection”; i.e., opinions that recipient can use to demonstrate good faith
as a defense to penalties in the event it is found to have underpaid. Here
the requisite threshold of validity rises to fifty percent. These rules may
become less important due to the cutback in “penalty protection” in 2010
legislation;
• a requirement that lawyers who play a substantial role with respect to
shelter-like “reportable transactions” maintain and produce on demand lists
of clients involved in the transactions;
• a requirement, addressed to clients but important for lawyers, that
“questionable tax positions” be affirmatively disclosed on the return;
• most radically, lawyers who give material advice or assistance with
respect to “reportable transactions” are obliged to report the advice on their
own initiative to the IRS on an “information return.”
While far more radical than the securities developments, these reforms
have not prompted the uniform resistance on the part of the tax bar; indeed
important portions have been embraced and encouraged by prominent
members of the tax bar. These members have responded to perceived
weaknesses in the regulatory regime, not by trying to distinguish
themselves in their willingness to exploit them, but by publicizing them in
ways designed to assist and pressure the regulators to close them.
Ambiguities of Contextualization, or A Tale of Two Bars
As an abstract matter, we can imagine that both ideology and selfinterest might lead business lawyers in two directions: (1) toward a
champion or gladiator model that emphasizes lawyers’ role in protecting
client autonomy from state power; (2) toward a gatekeeper or intermediary
model that emphasizes lawyers’ role in mediating between private and
public interests.
In the first model, we would expect lawyers to take an adversarial
posture against the state and to compete for clients in terms of their relative
willingness to assist in the evasion or frustration of costly regulation
through aggressive planning and litigation. We would also expect them to
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resist practice standards and to embrace, or at least tolerate, a race to the
bottom.
In the second model, we would expect lawyers to take a collaborative
posture toward the state and to compete in terms of their ability to induce
regulators to trust their clients and to devise modes of compliance that
achieve public goals at lower private costs. For example, regulators and
private collaborators who trust the client will reward her with less costly
rules, verification, and monitoring procedures. Here, we would expect to
see leading lawyers supporting publicly enforced high standards as a means
of avoiding a race to the bottom.
An important sector of the tax bar seems to have embraced something of
an intermediary approach, while the securities bar seems to be generally
ambivalent. It portrays its main function as, ultimately, compliance, but it
resists direct gatekeeping responsibilities in the name of a managerialist
conception of client loyalty and a largely mythical norm of confidentiality.
No doubt the contrasting trajectories are an instance of contextualization.
But there remains the question of whether the particular configuration of
contextualization should be understood in functional terms or in some other
way. Have securities and tax played out differently because differing
practical circumstances make the optimal role of a lawyer different in the
two contexts? Or should we understand the differences more in historical
and political terms?
A functionalist explanation might emphasize that securities enforcement
does not depend entirely on an understaffed agency but benefits from the
vigilance of investment bankers, investors, and an active plaintiffs’ bar.
Tax enforcement, on the other hand, largely depends on a woefully
understaffed IRS.
A historical explanation would point out that there is a longstanding
tradition within the elite tax bar that embraces the gatekeeping role, a
tradition that seems to have emerged independently of public or market
pressures.
A political explanation might point to a difference in the competitive
situation of securities and tax lawyers. The barriers to entry in tax practice
are fairly low, and in a race to the bottom, traditional qualifications may
count for less than amoral aggressiveness and willingness to take risks.
Elite lawyers may find it easier to support high standards if the standards
neutralize the advantages of less credentialed but more aggressive
competitors. By contrast, barriers to entry in securities practice are much
higher, and elite practitioners have less cause to worry that low standards
will permit uncredentialed upstarts to eat their lunch.
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Conclusion
All these explanations seem to have merit; I don’t have a view as to how
they should be weighed. A point about which I am confident is that we
need to attend to these developments in securities and tax both because the
areas are intrinsically important and because some of the innovations in
these areas represent alternative approaches to professional regulation that
may turn out to have more general application.
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